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Abstract 
This Article analyses the treatment of suretyship agreements across the EU in 
the context provided by (1) the extent to which they reveal a ‘common core’ of 
EC private law; (2) the policy proposition that to stem legal fragmentation le-
gal homogeneity and the assimilation of legal traditions is inevitable; (3) 
whether the goal of creating a single market in financial services requires a 
regulatory response whether measures of sector specific EC legislation, maxi-
mum harmonisation directives or broader codification. Predictably, given their 
polycontextural function, we are confronted with starkly divergent national 
approaches towards such agreements. Adapting Teubner on the hybridisation 
of contract, the paper proceeds to consider how we may see elements of com-
monality arising through the tension between differing legal traditions and di-
vergent national approaches. The paper argues that Europe is becoming ever 
more a mixed jurisdiction, finishing with a prediction of the relevance of a 
strategy involving both measures of sector-specific harmonisation and a pro-
gramme of non-legislative harmonisation through judicial convergence. 
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I. Introduction 
This paper looks to describe the treatment of surety agreements across Europe 
in its wider law and policy context. Faced with a diversity of legal approach 
the case for harmonising suretyships’ law, for codifying private law more gen-
erally, or for seeking to create a single market in financial services may appear 
irresistible. This paper argues that this perception is flawed; that we must allow 
for diversity in the treatment of suretyships. After setting out the core of dis-
cord attention turns to consideration of initiatives aimed at producing greater 
coherence in the treatment of European Private law disputes. The analysis is 
divided into four main sections. The paper begins, in placing the treatment of 
surety agreements in their broader context, by challenging the assumption that 
a ‘common core’ of suretyship law exists (Section II). The paper then proceeds 
to chart the diverse functions of surety agreements (Section III). In the main 
body of this paper a comparative survey of the national approaches to Surety-
ship law and the proposals on the treatment of surety agreements made by the 
Study Group on a European Civil Code (SGECC) is undertaken (Section IV). 
Finally, some conclusions are drawn which principally aim to (1) chart the 
fault-lines of legal fragmentation; (2) suggest an alternative analytical ap-
proach and; (3) propose the potential significance of a ‘mixed’ legislative and 
non-legislative approach (Section V). 
II. Context: Law, Policy and Economics 
A. Law 
By focusing on suretyships we can gain important insights into just how 
‘common’ or ‘uncommon’ the ‘common core’ of European private law is. This 
paper analyses the treatment of non-professional surety agreements: unilateral 
contracts between non-professional sureties – in favour of family members, 
friends, and, most frequently, spouses – and creditors. Given the close emo-
tional ties between principal debtor and surety, the surety may not be in a posi-
tion to decline standing surety. This confronts us with a choice between pro-
tecting vulnerable, emotionally dependent sureties, where no amount of pre-
contractual information will dissuade the wife from standing surety for her 
husband,1 and the countervailing claims of contractual integrity, and the need 
                                                 
1  J. Gernhüber, Ruinöse Bürgschaften als Folge familiärer Verbundenheit, (1995) JZ 
1086, at 1093: ‘Warnings and advice... are only useful where the addressee is pre-
pared to accept them.’ (author’s translation). 
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to assert the fundamental freedom to enter into unwise agreements.2 Here the 
limits of the information paradigm, extensively relied upon in the construction 
of EC secondary law until now, are illuminated.3 As this analysis discloses, 
whilst suretyships are ‘common’ throughout the EU, the approach taken to-
wards such agreement and the precise location of protective mechanisms varies 
significantly from one legal system to the next. 
B. Policy 
Those surveying the debate on the future of European private law, caught be-
tween the calls for ‘greater coherence’ and the need for codification on the one 
hand,4 those warning of the dangers of ‘legal fragmentation’ on the other,5 and 
those arguing ‘coherent fragmentation’ in the middle6 may well be struck by 
the aptness of Teubner’s picture of the beast of reciprocal misunderstanding in 
legal communication: the two-headed Janus;7 begging the question of whether 
European private law Jurists are even interested in communication across legal 
orders in the first place. In this sense the state of debate in EC private law is 
reminiscent of the all-or-nothing approach to sovereignty which accompanied 
                                                 
2  Inter alia Ulster Bank v Fitzgerald, [2001] IEHC 159: para 10: ‘(T)he courts are not 
required to intervene to protect a contracting party from ill-advised action… the 
court is not entitled to relieve her (Ms Williams) of her obligations… merely be-
cause a more prudent person might not have signed them.’ 
3  Article 153(1) EC: ‘In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high 
level of… protection, the Community shall contribute to protecting the health, safety 
and economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their rights to informa-
tion, education and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests.’ 
4  C. von Bar, From Principles to Codification: Prospects for European Private law, 
(2002) 8 CJEL 379; O. Lando, Does the European Union need a Civil Code, (2003) 
49 RIW 1, C. von Bar, O. Lando & S. Swan, Communication on European Contract 
law: Joint Response of the Commission on European Contract law and the Study 
Group on a European Civil Code, (2002) 10 ERPL 183.  
5  B. Markesinis, Why a code is not the best way to advance the cause of European 
legal unity, (1997) 5 ERPL 519-524; P. Legrand, European Legal Systems are not 
Converging, (1997) 45 ICLQ 52; P. Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 
(1997) 60 MLR 44, P. Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, (2003) 4 
MJ 111, most spectacularly P. Legrand, Antivonbar, (2006) 1 JCL 1.  
6  M.W. Hesselink, The Politics of European Contract Law: Who has an Interest in 
What Kind of Contract Law for Europe? (2002) Global Jurist Frontiers, Vol. 2, 
No.1, Art. 3: http://www.bepress.com./gj/frontiers/vol2/iss1/art3. 
7  G. Teubner, The two faces of Janus: rethinking Legal Pluralism, (1992) 13 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 1443, at 1445-48. 
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the process of European integration itself; expressing the fear that homogene-
ity, assimilation and the suppression of national legal traditions are the end 
products as much of European integration in general, as the Europeanisation of 
private law in particular.8 More optimistically, it is possible to think of produc-
tive, imaginative and more sophisticated collaboration which need not inevita-
bly point towards the homogenous core of European private law.9 
C. Economics 
The economic case against intervention to improve the protection of the vul-
nerable surety rests on a number of propositions: 
- First, that the market is self-sufficient; that it is simply not in the banks’ 
interests to offer ‘unfair suretyships’ for fear that they will lose market 
share.  
- Second, solvency assessment procedures are objective, proportional and 
non-discriminatory and are therefore more efficient than legislative 
regulation.  
- Third, banking procedures are reliable; agreements have to be formal-
ised, in the course of which the parties are informed by a notary/solicitor 
                                                 
8  Generally: Z. Bankowski & A. Scott, The European Union and Its Order: The Legal 
Theory of European Integration (London, Blackwell, 1999). In the context of Euro-
peanisation: H. Collins, Good faith in European Contract law (1994) 14 OJLS 229 at 
254: ‘Approximation of laws entails both homogeneity of legal forms and eventually 
assimilation of social values… (T)his requires an abandonment of the common law’s 
style of analogical and pragmatic reasoning… in which the law is developed by 
elaborate discursive practices rather than deductions from… the delphic utterances 
of the European Court of Justice. And the assimilation of social values embodied in 
the law suggests that the common law of contract… designed for a nation of shop-
keepers, will eventually have to succumb to a more communitarian ideal which bal-
ances the interests of consumers against those of shopkeepers.’   
9  S. Weatherill & S. Vogenauer, The European Community’s Competence for a com-
prehensive harmonisation of Contract law – An empirical analysis (2005) 30 ELRev 
821 at 826: ‘The Commission is provoking a deeply significant debate ranging over 
culture, economics and constitutional legitimacy.’ S. Weatherill, Why object to the 
Harmonisation of Private law by the EC, (2004) 12 ERPL 633 at 660: ‘In taking se-
riously the vigour of constitutional, cultural and economic objections to harmonisa-
tion it is possible for all affected jurists to collaborate in identifying the way forward 
for a sharing of responsibility in the evolution of a European private law which must 
be based on perceptions more sophisticated than a mere glorification of harmonisa-
tion, just as it must not exaggerate the inviolability of national legal culture and 
thinking.’ 
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of the risks involved in the transaction.  
Yet according to economic logic a single market in financial services should 
lead to economies of scale and enhanced conditions for growth.10 Given the 
differences between Member States’ financial services’ laws, the Commission 
has taken the view that improving access and resort to credit, enhancing re-
sponsible lending, and further encouraging the active consumer could generate 
significant growth in the EU. The aim of encouraging the depth, liquidity and 
dynamism in European financial markets to allow more efficient resource allo-
cation and enhanced competition11 was also an aspect of the European Coun-
cil’s Lisbon strategy.12 To these ends the Commission proposed the adoption of 
a new, maximum harmonisation Directive on consumer credit which was to 
include consumer suretyships. 13 The Commission’s interest in the integration 
                                                 
10  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the har-
monisation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member 
States concerning credit for consumers, Brussels 11.9.2002, (COM(2002) 443 final) 
Explanatory Memorandum, Section 1.2. at 3: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex.  
11  Green Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005-2010) (COM(2005) 177 final.) at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances. Financial Services White Paper 2005-
2010: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/white_paper. identifying EC ob-
jectives of an integrated, open, inclusive, competitive and efficient financial market; 
removal of the remaining barriers to financial services; high levels of financial sta-
bility, consumer protection; deepened relations with other financial marketplaces 
and globally enhanced European influence. 
12  Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23-24 March 2000:  
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs: ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion.’ 
13  Maximum harmonisation provisions are those prohibitive of more stringent national 
measures, minimum harmonisation provisions are permissive of more protective na-
tional measures. Minimum harmonisation is specified in EC policy areas (i.e. Arti-
cles 153 and 176 EC in consumer and environmental protection). Maximum har-
monisation may be adopted for market integration purposes (Articles 94 and 95 EC). 
As the Court of Justice held, Case C-376/98, Germany v Parliament and Council 
(Tobacco Advertising), [2000] E.C.R. I-8419, maximum harmonisation may not be 
resorted to opportunistically, para 84: ‘if a mere finding of disparities between na-
tional rules and of the abstract risk of obstacles to the exercise of fundamental free-
doms or of distortions to competition… were sufficient to justify the choice of Arti-
cle 100a (now 95) as a legal basis, judicial review of compliance with the proper le-
gal basis might be rendered nugatory.’ See: C-210/03, R v Secretary of State for 
Health (Swedish Match), [2000] ECR I-11893 paras. 26, 30-32, 34 and 68. The 
Commission’s Consumer Policy Strategy sought adoption of maximum harmonisa-
tion: 2002-6: COM(2002) 208 final.: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers. See, S. Weath-
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of the financial services’ market can be explained: extrapolating from U.K. 
levels of secured and unsecured debt, there appeared to be a potential for a 
European debt market in excess of 13 trillion Euro;14 indebtedness as a spur to 
growth was not being fully harnessed. Increasingly, therefore, the question is 
not whether but how a single financial services’ market could be achieved: by 
piecemeal measures of harmonisation; by more adventurous measures of ‘in-
ternal market’, maximum harmonisation; or by comprehensive codification in 
a European Civil Code? Moreover, what type of financial services’ regulation 
recommends itself: the Anglo-American model of substantially unregulated 
financial services15 or a high level of protection?16 Alternatively, is the integra-
tion of the financial services’ market best left to less invasive judicial harmoni-
sation,17 to a pragmatic competition of legal orders18 or to the market and spon-
taneous harmonisation,19 or best achieved through a mediation of claims 
                                                                                                                                                     
erill, Cases and Materials on EU Law, (OUP, 2006), at 617-657. Proposed directive, 
Cited above note 10, Section 3, Explanatory Memorandum emphasising the infor-
mation paradigm, at 8: ‘The directive also covers surety agreements. The harmonisa-
tion being sought for these agreements will centre mainly on the information to be 
provided to consumers concluding such agreements, even if they guarantee credit 
that is granted for employment-related purposes.’ 
14  In February 2006, U.K. secured lending stood at GBP 981,8 bn. up 10.6% on 2005, 
consumer credit at GBP 192,6 bn. up 8.7% on 2005, making a total indebtedness of 
GBP 1.174 trillion. Policy initiatives: http://www.creditaction.org and http://www.debt-
on-our-doorstep. 
15  C. McCreevy, DG Internal Market, Speech at Centre for European Reform, ‘Finan-
cial Markets Integration’, London, 9 March 2006:   
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mccreevy. 
16  Article 153 (ex 129a) EC specifies a high level of consumer protection and, simulta-
neously, resort to measures of minimum harmonisation: (1) In order to promote the 
interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Com-
munity shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic interests of 
consumers…(3) The Community shall contribute to the attainment of the objectives 
referred to in paragraph 1 through: (a) measures adopted pursuant to Article 95 in 
the context of the completion of the internal market; (b) measures which support, 
supplement and monitor the policy pursued by the Member States… (5) Measures 
adopted pursuant to paragraph 4 shall not prevent any Member State from main-
taining or introducing more stringent protective measures… (author’s emphasis).  
17  A. Colombi Ciacchi, Non-Legislative Harmonisation of Private Law under the Euro-
pean Constitution: The Case of Unfair Suretyships, [2005] 13 ERPL 285.  
18  J.H.M. van Erp, European Private Law: Post-modern Dilemmas and Choices (1999) 
3 E.J.C.L. at: http://www.ejcl.org/31/art31-1.html. 
19  A.I. Ogus, Competition between National Legal systems: a Contribution of Eco-
nomic Analysis to Comparative law (1999) 48 I.C.L.Q. 405. 
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through a ‘constitutionalisation’ of private law?20 These issues intersect with 
the debate on whether we need to revise our perception of law to admit that 
law depends on tension and contradiction; that a multiplicity of systems can 
work together as a unitary network. 
III. Polycontextual Function of Surety Arrangements 
The Surety arrangement is frequently only precariously demarcated from other 
types of guarantees: indemnities, performance bonds, independent or demand 
guarantees; this being an area of law where there is gradation; where terms and 
concepts overlap. Rather than clean delineation, a spectrum of guarantees and 
guarantee protection operates.21 Demarcation problems have generated litiga-
tion and legislation. This section maps out ‘common’ and ‘uncommon’ ele-
ments of the suretyship, describing the complex, atypical relationship between 
surety and creditor and the resulting polycontextural function of such agree-
ments. 
A. The Common core of Surety agreements 
There is agreement on the general function of the suretyship as a unilateral 
guarantee of secondary and accessory liability. Given the imbalance of bar-
gaining power and the parties’ proximity, the need to protect the guarantor is 
similarly a common concern throughout Europe. All European legal orders 
recognise that inadequate protection could lead to sureties facing over-
indebtedness. All Member States have attempted to increase protection where, 
otherwise, the creditor would have been under no obligation to the surety. A 
need for broader coherence in the treatment of suretyships has been identified 
by the Court of Justice and the Commission. Yet surety protection is available 
in only a few cases: in Dietzinger on the basis of the Doorstep Selling Direc-
                                                 
20  O. Gerstenberg, Private law and the New European Constitutional Settlement (2004) 
10 E.L.J. 766. See also: A. Colombi Ciacchi, cited above note 17. 
21  G. McCormack, Protection of surety guarantors in England – prophylactics and pro-
cedure, in: A. Colombi Ciacchi (ed.), Protection of Non-Professional Sureties in 
Europe: Formal and Substantive Disparity, (Forthcoming: Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
2007). Also: A. Colombi Ciacchi, Der Schutz des Bürgen in Europa – Bericht über 
ein rechtsvergleichendes Forschungsprojekt und seine zweite Jahrestagung (2006) 4 
VuR 141. 
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tive, 22 where the Court, ambiguously, held that such contracts as covered by 
the Directive could be understood to include guarantee contracts where the 
principal contract concerned the supply of goods or services to a consumer.23 
Thus, where guarantees covering consumer credit are entered into outside the 
trader’s premises, they may fall within the directive. The surety then enjoys 
withdrawal rights under the ‘cooling-off’ period provided for.24 A gap in con-
sumer protection was subsequently recognized in Berliner Kindl,25 where it 
was held that the 1987 Consumer Credit Directive did not cover a suretyship 
for repayment of credit where neither surety nor debtor was acting in the 
course of his/her trade or profession. Article 23 of the Draft Directive on Con-
                                                 
22  Case C-45/96, Bayerische Hypothekenbank v Edgar Dietzinger, [1998] ECR 1-1199. 
Council Directive 85/577/EEC on contracts negotiated away from business prem-
ises, OJ 1985 L 372/31. 
23  Case C-45/96, ibid. Para. 20: ‘In view of the close link between a credit agreement 
and a guarantee securing its performance and the fact that the person guaranteeing 
repayment of a debt may either assume joint and several liability for payment of the 
debt or be the guarantor of its repayment, it cannot be excluded that the furnishing of 
a guarantee falls within the scope of the directive.’ Author’s emphasis. See gener-
ally: P. Rott, Consumer Guarantees in the Future Consumer Credit Directive: Man-
datory Ban on Consumer Protection? (2005) 13 ERPL 383 at 384. 
24  German doorstep ‘junk real estate’ sales highlight problems in the financial services’ 
due diligence standards: Case C-481/99, Georg and Helga Heininger v Bayerische 
Hypo- und Vereinsbank, [2001] E.C.R. I-9945; Case C-350/03, Elisabeth and Wolf-
gang Schulte v Deutsche Bausparkasse Badenia AG, [2005] ECR I-9215; Case C-
229/04, Crailsheimer Volksbank eG v Klaus Conrads and others, [2005] ECR I-
9273. P. Rott, Risikohaftung der Banken für ‘Schrottimmobilien’ (2006) 3 GPR 25. 
P. Rott, Linked Contracts and Doorstep Selling: Casenote on ECJ Judgments of 25 
October 2005, Cases C-350/03, Schulte and C-299/04, Crailsheimer Volksbank, 
(2006) 1 Yearbook of Consumer Law, 403. 
25  Case C-208/98, Berliner Kindl Brauerei AG, [2000] ECR 1-1741. (Council Direc-
tive 87/102/EEC for the approximation of the laws concerning consumer credit, OJ 
1987 L372/31.). Paras 25-26: (25) ‘Given the objectives of Directive 87/102, on the 
other hand, which almost entirely concern the information to be given to the princi-
pal debtor regarding the implications of his commitment, and bearing in mind the 
fact that it is almost devoid of provisions that might afford an effective safeguard to 
the guarantor – whose primary concern is to have knowledge concerning the sol-
vency of the principal debtor in order to assess the likelihood of being called upon to 
repay the credit granted - that directive must be regarded as not being designed to 
apply to contracts of guarantee.’ (26) ‘Furthermore, the scope of the Directive can-
not be widened to cover contracts of guarantee solely on the ground that such agree-
ments are ancillary to the principal agreement whose performance they underwrite, 
since there is no support for such an interpretation in the wording of the Directive, 
as was pointed out in paragraph 18 above, or in its scheme and aims.’ 
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sumer Credit, subsequently sought to extend protection;26 yet the most prob-
lematic agreement, the non-professional guarantee of a business loan, fell out-
side the scope of the draft. At the behest of the financial services’ industry, the 
Directive has since been revised by DG Internal Market. Yet in its most recent 
metamorphosis the influence of consumer protection is almost entirely lost.27 
The draft directive jettisoned the proposals relating to non-professional, con-
sumer suretyships.28 
B. Characteristics and risks of Surety agreements 
The characteristics of the surety or guarantee contract can be briefly summa-
rised: 
- The surety guarantees a sum/performance owed by the principal debtor 
to the creditor; 
- Agreement between surety and creditor is unilateral;  
- Traditionally the creditor owed no duty towards the surety; 
- There is proximity between surety and principal debtor;  
- Suretyships were typically not to the spouse’s financial advantage; 
- Suretyships were frequently obtained through undue influence; 
- Inequality and proximity lead to a duty to inform being imputed to the 
creditor. 
The unilateral status of the suretyship explains the recent trend to recognise 
that the creditor has obligations to the guarantor.  
The surety’s risk is greatest where a business loan is guaranteed, and, where 
this does not stand in proportion to the surety’s income and assets, this may 
lead to an indefinite obligation rebounding on the surety following the princi-
pal debtor’s bankruptcy. This is exacerbated when bankruptcy ensues years 
after both the agreement and the divorce of principal and surety. The nature of 
the surety’s risk can be summarised: 
                                                 
26  For a history of the drafting of the directive: http://www.cml.org.uk.  
27  Policy evolution: U. Reifner, Konsumentenkreditrichtlinie im Europaparlament – 
Zurück zu den Siebzigern? (2004) VuR 85, Current critique contained in a modified 
proposal for a directive on credit agreements for consumers:   
http://www.responsible-credit.net. 
28  Amended Proposal for a Directive of the Parliament and of the Council on Credit 
Agreements for Consumers amending Council Directive 93/13 EC:  
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex. 
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- The guarantor is in a weak position as regards both the creditor and the 
principal; 
- A suretyship is an agreement of secondary and accessory liability;29  
- The surety’s liability is subsidiary to the principal debtor’s duty to settle, 
and accessory to the liability and existence of the principal debt;  
- The guarantor’s liability is conditional and co-terminous: if the principal 
debtor’s liability is reduced, then the guarantor’s liability is proportion-
ately reduced;  
- Detrimental modifications to the underlying contract discharge the 
surety: where, for example, a debtor is given more time to pay, failure to 
discharge the surety would, otherwise, render the surety’s rights worth-
less.30 
These features illuminate the extent to which protection may be delivered by 
provisions of suretyship and general contract law. Similarly, family law and 
insolvency law may influence protection. Thus the balancing of interests in 
protecting sureties is complex and involves more than the simple promotion of 
social justice; freedom of contract must also be upheld. While the law must 
intervene to avoid wholly disproportionate guarantees, it is also necessary to 
protect the creditor against fraud through asset transfers between family mem-
bers. Were suretyships too easily avoided, financial institutions would abandon 
the market, and/or increase the interest payable to compensate for the risk. Al-
ternately they could turn to other vehicles such as demand guarantees or might 
simply revert to insisting on secured credit. Moreover, the poverty law paradox 
is that, whilst over-indebtedness is a growing problem, the effect of higher 
standards of surety protection might be to isolate the poorest in society even 
more comprehensively from access to credit. The creditor is placed in an in-
vidious position: the fact that a security has been asked for, should put the 
surety on notice that the creditor has doubts as to the principal debtor’s credit-
worthiness; yet, instead, responsibility for the ‘unwise’ agreement and the 
debtor’s wrongdoing is attributed to the creditor. No matter how creditors de-
cide to deal with sureties they can be charged with encouraging indebtedness 
and of socially divisive behaviour: whether their practice is to stringently re-
                                                 
29  In England and Wales s.4 Statute of Frauds, 1677, provides that Suretyship agree-
ments involve: ‘any special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage 
of another person.’ 
30  Swire v Redman, (1876) 1 QBR 536 at 541. per Cockburn CJ: ‘if the creditor binds 
himself not to sue the principal… he… interfere(s) with the surety’s… right to sue… 
such interference with the rights of the surety –… must operate to deprive the credi-
tor of his right to recourse against the surety.’ 
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quire sureties, leaving ‘bad risks’ to the sub-prime lending market, or whether 
they decide to waive security requirements to attract market-share can fuel 
over-indebtedness. Further, and, as the German doorstep sales cases confirm, 
the creditor should have an economic interest in due diligence independent of 
any regulatory framework.31 Due diligence, as an aspect of responsible lending, 
may represent a nexus between effective protection and financial services’ in-
dustry interests.  
C. Polycontextualism 
This survey confirms that the suretyship involves a plurality of parties and in-
terests. The suretyship has a polycontextural function; in which the interests 
involved can be mediated at a number of levels or fields of law:  
- Suretyship law: traditional defences and formal protection; 
- Contract law: traditional defences (fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresen-
tation); 
- Procedural protection: creditor’s duty to inform of the risks associated 
with the suretyship; 
- Unfair Contract Terms’ law: intervention of exemption clauses;  
- Consumer law: formal requirements and duties to inform; 
- Family law: protection of family interests, presumption of undue influ-
ence; 
- Insolvency law: regulation of rights of recourse, symmetry of Fresh 
Start protection; 
- Constitutional law: proportionality considerations (gross/excessive); 
- Property law: requiring secured lending; 
- General doctrine: undue influence, unconscionability and good faith; 
- Behavioural level: due diligence and autonomous regulation of bank 
practice. 
The diverse function of the surety agreement and the variety of locations of 
protective mechanisms from Member State to Member State affects both the 
level of protection and the prevalence of such agreements. Property law may 
insist on the registration of mortgages, so making suretyships relatively more 
attractive in particular legal orders, such as in Germany. Contrastingly, proce-
                                                 
31  British Banking Code of Practice now in seventh edition British Banking Code of 
Practice, March 2005, available at: www.bba.org.uk. 
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dural protection may make the suretyship less attractive, as in England and 
Wales. Where provisions of Family law are more or less receptive to a pre-
sumption of undue influence, or may free the ex-spouse from liability follow-
ing divorce, more or less protection can be provided. 
Whilst common elements in suretyships can therefore be recognised, the 
coherence of this picture becomes fragmented the higher the abstraction. 
Member States’ legal orders have their own demarcations locating protection 
in different legal institutions and fields of law. Even at a conceptual level the 
differences are significant: the suretyship involving either three parties in a 
two-transaction agreement,32 or a trilateral agreement.33 Whilst the creditor 
may be seen in some legal orders as the professional (Germany), in others he 
or she may also be a non-professional (France). A major distinction emerges in 
the balances between market-liberal formalism and interventionist, substantive 
approaches. The market-liberal approach underscores the importance of free-
dom of contract, while the substantive approach focuses on the parties’ bar-
gaining power.34 The market and will react differently as between the type of 
approach adopted, yet sometimes in surprising ways: a procedural approach 
may ultimately lead creditors to leave the market, whilst an interventionist ap-
proach may lead to problems of moral hazard.  
IV.  Comparative survey 
In the following comparative survey of national approaches a cross-section of 
protection standards are charted. At this stage the broader contours of a com-
parative law survey are mapped.35 The section ends by considering the Study 
Group proposals on the location of protective mechanisms. 
                                                 
32  Two-transactions: M. Siems, No Risk, No Fun? Should Spouses be Advised before 
Committing to Guarantees? A Comparative Analysis, [2002] ERPL 509 at 517. O. 
Cherednychenko, The Constitionalisation of Contract Law: Something New under 
the Sun? (2004) 8 E.J.C.L: www.ejcl.org/81/art81-3.html; http://www.ejcl.org. 
33  J.H.M. van Erp, Supra 18: Art. 7:850(1) Dutch Civil Code, provides: ‘Suretyship is 
a contract whereby one party, the surety, obliges himself towards the other party, the 
main creditor, to perform an obligation to which a third person, the main debtor, is 
or will be bound towards the main creditor.’ 
34  U. Reifner, cited above, note 27. 
35  More detailed national accounts available in A. Colombi Ciacchi cited above note 
21. 
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A. Common Law… and Scotland 
This section deals with the Common law jurisdictions of Ireland and England 
and Wales and Scotland. Here, despite many commonalities in social practice, 
there are important disparities of legal approach. As this section seeks to estab-
lish the acid question, however, is whether theoretical disparity (or non-
availability) of legal rules truly produces a practical divergence of approach. 
English law has taken the lead in defining onerous procedural requirements for 
banks and solicitors to comply with to ensure that sureties receive full and in-
dependent advice prior to entering into such agreements. Scotland, in the ab-
sence of equitable doctrine, has followed this lead indirectly via bank practice 
and autonomous professional regulation – though not in the letter of the law. 
Ireland, meanwhile, has instituted, through regulation, a more traditional in-
formation paradigm in its law. 
i. England and Wales 
The common law approach relies on doctrine to vitiate unfair contracts: fraud, 
duress, misrepresentation, undue influence, inequality of bargaining power 
and, as a last resort, unconscionability.36 Other protective mechanisms, such as 
exemption clauses are not effective because exemption clauses in suretyships 
do not work to exclude the creditor’s liability but to preserve the surety’s li-
ability. Similarly, the 1999 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
(UTCCR) contemplates the reverse scenario to that typically operating in the 
suretyship: the spouse entering into a suretyship is not acting in the course of 
his/her business, whilst, typically, the creditor, as beneficiary, is. Other than 
through the doctrine of unconscionability, English law does not deal with the 
substantive unfairness of the surety agreement. Practically therefore, the 
Courts police suretyships via the creditor’s constructive notice of the debtor’s 
wrongdoing, the doctrine of undue influence and the elaboration of procedural 
safeguards. In O’Brien a suretyship was set aside where the creditor was held 
to have had constructive notice of the principal debtor’s wrongdoing.37 Ac-
cording to the court in O’Brien, the creditor must seek to ensure that the 
agreement is properly obtained and, to this end, must take ‘reasonable steps’ to 
                                                 
36  G. McCormack, in: A. Colombi Ciacchi (ed.) cited above note 21. Inequality of bar-
gaining power: Lloyds Bank v Bundy, [1975] QB 326, per Lord Denning at 339 Un-
conscionability: Alex Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd., [1983] 1 
WLR 87 per Millett QC at 94-95. ‘First, one party has been at a serious disadvan-
tage… Second, this… has been exploited… in some morally culpable man-
ner…[a]nd third, the resulting transaction has been… overreaching and oppressive.’ 
37  Barclays Bank v O’Brien, [1994] 1 AC 180. 
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bring home to the surety the risks involved in the transaction. However, the 
surety has to establish that he or she had entered into the arrangement as a re-
sult of the undue influence, misrepresentation or other legal wrong of the prin-
cipal debtor. In Etridge (No.2) it was held that creditors must ensure that inde-
pendent advice is given to the surety: specific criteria, ‘core minimum re-
quirements’, apply to creditors and their legal advisers in all non-business 
third-party security cases.38 The Law Society of England and Wales issued 
guidelines for solicitors on the basis of the Etridge (No.2) core minimum re-
quirements, including a draft letter to the spouse standing surety, these guide-
lines are available on the Law Society’s website.39  
ii. Scotland 
In contrast, Scots’ Case-law adopted a more restrictive approach.40 This diver-
gence may be attributed to the fact that the equitable remedies available in 
England in O’Brien and Etridge (No. 2) are unknown in Scotland and that con-
structive notice as applied in O’Brien does not exist. The Scottish creditor tra-
ditionally owed no duty to disclose details of the principal debtor’s financial 
position to the cautioner. The exception arose where it could be proven that the 
creditor misled the cautioner. This approach is confirmed in Smith v Bank of 
Scotland where it was held that undue influence cannot be presumed in close, 
family relationships. Meanwhile, in Forsyth it was held that banks were enti-
tled to place a normal degree of reliance on solicitors’ due diligence.41 Good 
faith required no more than that the creditor should not take securities where 
there was reason to think that consent had been vitiated by misrepresentation, 
undue influence or some other wrongful act. Smith v Bank of Scotland ex-
tended the ‘reasonable steps’ owed by the creditor to ensure that the surety is 
alerted to the risks of the transaction, along O’Brien lines, into Scotland on the 
                                                 
38  Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No.2), [2002] 2 AC 773. Judgment, Lord 
Nicholls, para 57. ‘if the bank knows that the solicitor has not duly advised the wife 
or … if (it) knows facts from which it ought to have realised that the wife has not re-
ceived the appropriate advice … the bank will proceed at its own risk.’ 
39  Solicitors’ duties post Etridge including model letter to wife where charging home to 
secure loan to husband or his business, Law Society, May 2002, available at: 
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk. Guidelines flanked by provisions on conflicts of in-
terest in the Solicitors’ Practice Rules, 1990. 
40  L.J. Smith, Deferential Spouses and Cautionary Wrecks: Personal or Cautionary 
Obligations in Scots Law, in: A. Colombi Ciacchi (ed.), cited above note 21. 
41  Smith v Bank of Scotland, 1997 SC (HL) 111; Forsyth v Royal Bank of Scotland, 
2000 SLT 1295; Subsequently: Royal Bank of Scotland v Wilson and another, 
(2003) SCLR 716.  
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basis of good faith rather than constructive notice.42 Importantly, the ‘reason-
able steps’ are only incumbent on the creditor when he or she is put on notice 
that the cautioner may have entered into the transaction as a result of undue 
influence, and this will be a matter of fact. Subsequently, while Black and 
Thomson43 confirmed Smith v Bank of Scotland they made it clear that the 
English ‘core minimum requirements’ of Etridge (No.2) do not apply in Scot-
land. Nevertheless, there has always been a strong, practical interest in ensur-
ing consistency between England and Scotland, especially in financial matters. 
The major banks and building societies have all taken on board the Etridge 
‘core minimum requirements’, and the Conveyancing Committee of the Law 
Society of Scotland has promulgated guidelines similar to those issued by the 
Law Society of England and Wales. These guidelines are flanked by provi-
sions on conflicts of interests and the rules relevant to professional miscon-
duct.44 Thus in practice bank and professional practice ensures that much the 
same approach and result obtains in Scotland as across the border. 
iii. Ireland  
Despite the theoretical, and as yet unexplored, basis for a high protective stan-
dard contained in the provisions of the Irish Constitution - the protection of 
family interests and the Directive Principles of Social Policy - Equity played 
the lead role in Irish suretyships’ law.45 Yet important distinctions to the Eng-
lish position emerge. On undue influence, the Irish Supreme Court in Hogan46 
followed O’Brien but underscored that the husband/wife relationship did not 
automatically raise a presumption of undue influence. Meanwhile, and more 
                                                 
42  ibid. Smith v Bank of Scotland Lord Clyde at 122: ‘All that is required of him (the 
creditor) is that he should take reasonable steps to secure that… he acts throughout 
in good faith. So far as the substance of those steps are concerned it seems to me that 
it would be sufficient for the creditor to warn the… cautioner of the consequences of 
entering into the obligation and advising him or her to take independent advice.’ 
43  Clydesdale Bank plc v Black 2002 SLT 764, Thomson v The Royal Bank of Scot-
land plc., 2003 SCLR 964. 
44  Contained in the Solicitors (Scotland) Practice Rules, 1986 and the Solicitors (Scot-
land) Act, 1980. See: Inter-spouse guarantees: an update, thejournalonline (Journal 
of the Law Society of Scotland). October 2003, at 34 at:   
http://www.journalonline.co.uk/article/1000542.aspx. 
45  P. O’Callaghan, Protection from Unfair Suretyships in Ireland, in: A. Colombi Ciac-
chi (ed.), cited above note 21. See Article 41, Irish Constitution on Fundamental 
Rights and the particular protection to be afforded the Family, and Article 45, Irish 
Constitution on the Directive Principles of Social Policy.  
46  Bank of Nova Scotia v Hogan [1996] 3 IR 239. 
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specific to third party guarantees, the court in Fitzgerald held that constructive 
notice was too easily triggered in England:47 banks were only to be put on no-
tice if aware of special circumstances substantiating the principal debtor’s 
wrongdoing. A lower standard of protection than available in England resulted: 
transactions were not held void for undue influence because the surety had 
taken a decision a more prudent person would not have taken. However, sub-
sequently, in May 2003, the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of 
Ireland Act (2003) came into effect with the dual aims of lending the law on 
financial services a more consumer friendly focus and to allow a reassessment 
of the protection of vulnerable customers. In the wake of the Act, the Irish Fi-
nancial Services Authority (IFSRA) issued a Consumer Protection Code which 
came into force on 1 August 2006. Chapter 4(3) of the Code requires all finan-
cial services’ providers to issue a warning on all guarantee contracts.48 By this 
means, emphasis is placed on a more traditional ‘information paradigm’ 
model, a model which, in terms of protection, falls short of the ‘procedural-
ised’ lead given in Etridge. 
B. Established Civil Law Tradition in Western Europe 
Despite belonging to an established tradition of jurisprudence, the western 
European Civil law tradition discloses a variety of approaches and variations in 
levels of surety protection. Rather than exemplifying coherence, the ap-
proaches taken confront us with a patchwork of protective standards. 
i. Germany  
German law requires, as the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), 
has laid down, and relies on the substantive rather than the procedural control 
of surety agreements.49 In Germany freedom of contract exists, according to 
constitutional principles, only where the parties have similar bargaining power 
and the courts must intervene to protect the guarantor in cases of inequality. In 
cases in which an excessive burden between the sum guaranteed and the 
                                                 
47  Ulster Bank v Fitzgerald cited above note 2: ‘the relationship of husband and wife 
does not give rise to a presumption of undue influence… accordingly, the burden of 
proving undue influence is on the party alleging it.’ 
48  Chapter 4(3) Irish Consumer Protection Code reads as follows: ‘Warning: As a guar-
antor of this loan you will have to pay off the loan, the interest and all associated 
charges if the borrower does not. Before you sign this guarantee you should get in-
dependent legal advice.’ 
49  BverfG, 19 October 1993, BverfGE 89, 214 (Bürgschaft). 
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surety’s assets and income is determined the courts are bound to intervene to 
protect the surety. The courts apply the doctrines of immorality and good faith 
to ensure surety protection.50 Yet, as Rott argues, the reality of protection is 
that Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) decisions have simply caught the 
most extreme cases, and, as all real property assets must be liquidated before 
an excessive burden can be found, the guarantor/surety can effectively lose his 
home without this being seen as excessive by the courts. Moreover, a finding 
that the agreement was immoral can be avoided through procedural means; by 
obtaining judgment through an order for payment procedures.51 The German 
approach can be criticised: too little emphasis is placed on autonomy, there is a 
lack of transparency, and it is too inflexible.52 
ii. Austria  
Despite Austrian case-law approving of the German approach to surety protec-
tion,53 Austrian courts pursue a more traditional civil law approach. There are 
three sources of protection: the Austrian Civil Code (immorality, error or fraud 
and protection as regards the inclusion of surprising terms in the contract),54 
the Austrian Consumer Protection Act (Paragraph 25d CPA which allows judi-
cial discretion to reduce the level of the surety’s obligation; here, in stark con-
trast to the German approach, an unfair rather than a ‘gross’ disparity between 
                                                 
50  Doctrines of immorality (Sittenwidrigkeit) 138 BGB and good faith (Treu und 
Glauben) 242 BGB applied. 
51  Para. 688 German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung). Such an order can 
only be avoided if the guarantor can prove the bank chose the order with the sole pur-
pose of avoiding the immorality assessment, this is almost impossible to establish. 
52  On the lack of autonomy: H.A. Hesse & P. Kaufmann, Die Schutzpflicht und der 
Privatrechtsprechung, (1995) JZ 219; G. Teubner, Die Familienbürgschaft in der 
Kollision unverträglicher Handlungslogiken, (2000) KV 288, 296. On the lack of 
transparency: U. Diederichsen, Das Bundverfassungsgericht als oberstes 
Zivilgericht, (1998) 198 AcP 179, 247. On inflexibility: P. Rott, German Law on 
Family Suretyships: An Overrated System, in: A. Colombi Ciacchi (ed.), cited above 
note 21. 
53  Austrian Supreme Court, Judgment of 27 March 1995, OGH SZ 68/64. W. Faber, 
Protection of Non-Professional Sureties in Austria Austrian Reactions to German 
Developments and Original Ways of Consumer Protection, in: A. Colombi Ciacchi 
(ed.), cited above note 21. 
54  W. Faber ibid: Immorality (Sittenwidrigkeit): Para. 879 ABGB on good faith and 
fair dealing, parallels to special rules on usury (Para. 879(2)4 ABGB). ibid. Error 
(Irrtum, Para. 871 ABGB), fraud (Arglist, Para. 870 ABGB). ibid. Surprising terms 
(Geltungskontrolle, Para. 864a ABGB). 
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the sum guaranteed and the level of the surety’s assets and income is required), 
and the Austrian Bankruptcy Regulation; which organises a third tier of protec-
tion by allowing for the discharge of residual debts in cases of personal insol-
vency to avoid the risk of life-long over-indebtedness.55 
iii. Belgium 
Consumer protection was extended to sureties in Belgium under the terms of 
the 1991 Consumer Credit Act (CCA). The Act restricts the potential extent of 
the surety’s obligations; sums guaranteed must be specified (Article 34, CCA), 
and ‘all sums’ guarantees are null and void. Protection is also given by provi-
sions of Belgian Family law, which provides that contracts endangering family 
interests can be declared void by the courts. Insolvency law also plays an in-
creasingly important role, allowing for the discharge of non-professional sure-
ties for free: the judge can discharge the surety in full or in part where the ob-
ligation is not proportionate to his/her income and assets. But many distinc-
tions continue to plague the law: why should the bankrupt debtor’s surety be 
better placed than a non-bankrupt debtor’s surety, and why the differences 
drawn between cases of bankruptcy and cases of collective debt arrange-
ments?56 
iv. The Netherlands 
A layered structure of protection emerges in the Netherlands, with various 
provisions drawn from different parts of the Dutch Civil Code being applied: 
Book 3, on patrimonial law; Book 6, on the general law of contract; Book 7, on 
special contracts and, explicitly, suretyship agreements; Book 1, on family pro-
tection generally. The Dutch have thus adopted what has been described as a 
hybrid strategy between English proceduralisation, German constitutionalisa-
tion, while maintaining the freedom to enter into unwise agreements: a strategy 
between substantive and procedural control; which maintains a general duty on 
                                                 
55  ibid. for a Restschuldbefreiung three different procedures are available: first, if the 
principal debtor pays 20% of his debts within 2 years or 30% of his debts within 5 
years and the creditors agree, the residual debts will be extinguished (Zwangsaus-
gleich); second, the debtor enters a payments’ plan (Zahlungsplan), based on his as-
sessed income for the next 5 years. Finally, the Abschöpfungsverfahren provides that 
the debtor’s assets be liquidated, the debtor meeting at least 10% of his debts, then 
his residual debts may be extinguished, even against the creditors’ collective will. 
56  V. Sagaert, The protection of non-professional sureties in Belgian law, in: A. Co-
lombi Ciacchi (ed.), cited above note 21. 
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banks to protect customers, yet obliges sureties to inform themselves as to the 
scope of their potential liability. Dutch banks are therefore held to stringent 
due diligence requirements.57 Similarly, the Dutch assessment (Paragraph 
6.228, Dutch Civil Code) of mistake hinges upon the veracity of information 
supplied by the creditor.58 
v. France 
As Vigneron observes, as part of a move towards greater protection of the fam-
ily’s property, the French Parliament extended consumer protection to all 
guarantors of non-professional and professional debts in 2003 in the Loi 
Dutreuil.59 Consumer protection considerations now predominate in the treat-
ment of professional and non-professional surety agreements in France; con-
tract and surety law playing a more residual role. The balance struck in France 
favours consumer protection, yet this ‘inflation of protection’ has caused 
anomalies in the coherence of the overall standard of protection which is pro-
vided: why should, for example, the ex spouse be better placed than the widow 
or the principal debtor’s dependants? Why should consumer protection be ex-
tended to businessmen who are not consumers?60 The problem with extending 
the boundary of protection is that the floodgates to other categories of persons 
are successively opened. 
vi. Spain 
Surety agreements are common in Spain, and are required where solvency as-
sessments identify the debtor as a bad risk to the creditor. Yet protection is, 
nevertheless, highly fragmented and, ultimately, insufficient. Spanish demarca-
tion of commercial, civil and consumer law contributes to the problem; insist-
ing that the accessority principle precludes the application of protective princi-
ples of consumer law to what are deemed ‘commercial agreements’. Thus pro-
                                                 
57  See J.H.M van Erp, Protection of non-professional sureties under Dutch law: a frag-
mented approach, in A. Colombi Ciacchi, cited above note 21. On due diligence: 
Mees Pierson v Ten Bos Hoge Raad, 3 Januari 1998, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 
1999, 285.  
58  ibid., mistake: Van Lanschot Bankiers v Mrs Bink Hoge Raad, 1 June 1990, Neder-
landse Jurisprudentie 1991, 759. 
59  See S. Vigneron, Protection of Non-professional Sureties in France: A trop em-
brassé, mal étreint, in: A. Colombi Ciacchi (ed.), cited above note 21. See: s.L. 341-
1 to 341-6, French Consumer Code. 
60  ibid. 
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tective principles cannot be extended to commercial, albeit non-professional, 
surety agreements. Unfair surety agreements are not dealt with by specific leg-
islation or case-law, but thus by a cocktail of general principles of contract 
law, consumer protection and unfair contract terms. A lack of choice in enter-
ing surety agreements on grounds of family ties/emotional dependency is ana-
lysed in terms of the lack of consent; and on the distorting effect of insufficient 
or non-existent information on consent. Similarly, courts may look to the con-
tent of standard contract terms to review the validity of surety agreements. 
Apart from general contract law, explicit surety law, family and insolvency 
law will influence the validity and extent of surety agreements. It is this famil-
iar diversity of protection that is held responsible for the overall under-
protection of sureties. General principles of law have become diluted by the 
effect of overlapping sectoral rules and regulation.61 
C. Nordic Countries 
Another patchwork of law emerges in the Nordic countries, where we can con-
trast the invasive approach taken in Finland, with the adoption of specific sure-
tyships’ legislation, with the quite different Swedish perception of and reaction 
to the problem. Our comparative analysis is limited to these two jurisdictions. 
i. Finland 
Finnish experience with unfair suretyships has been spectacular.62 Following 
the boom of the 80s, characterised by easy credit, little statutory protection and 
lax banking practice, recession ensued in the 90s. As debts were called in, 
sureties began to realise the extent of their obligations. As a specific legal 
framework for protection was unavailable, appeal was made to the general 
principles of good faith and contractual loyalty. But while these ideas were de-
veloped by academics and supported by the lower courts, the Supreme Court 
refused to extend protection. Developments culminated with the adoption of 
legislation: the 1999 Guaranties and Third-party Pledges Act (Finnish GA).63 
                                                 
61  T. Rodriguez de las Heras Ballell, Protection from Unfair Suretyships in Spain, Con-
ference Paper, ZERP Unfair Suretyships conference 3-4 November 2006, Bremen 
(The conference paper is in the Marie Curie ToK project’s database in Bremen). 
62  T. Mikkola, Protection from unfair Suretyships in Finland, Conference Paper, ZERP 
Unfair Suretyships conference 3-4 November 2006, Bremen (The conference paper 
is in the Marie Curie ToK project’s database in Bremen). 
63  ibid. 1999 Act on Guarantees and Third-party Pledges entered into force on 1 Octo-
ber 1999. 
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The Act was aimed at recalibrating the relationship between creditors and 
guarantors, in particular, by giving guarantors better insight into what a surety 
agreement involves before entering into it. The Finnish GA distinguishes pri-
vate and commercial agreements: where the agreement is ‘private’, the surety 
being a private party and the creditor a professional lender, the provisions of 
the Act are mandatory and protection is interpreted to the surety’s favour. The 
Act provides that if a private person stands surety the maximum amount of li-
ability as well as a time limit for the obligation must be specified. Addition-
ally, the private party may terminate the agreement on notice. Further, the 
surety’s position vis-à-vis the principal is enhanced as regards rights of re-
course. While limitation on debts and suretyships is set at ten years, section 
5(2) Finnish GA clarifies that non-professional sureties cannot be of unlimited 
duration. Meanwhile, creditors are placed under significant, compulsory and 
continuing disclosure duties; sureties have rights to revoke agreements or have 
their liability adjusted where they have not received adequate information.64 
Disclosure is comprehensive, embracing information that must be given before 
an agreement (Section 12), during the agreement (Section 13), and as regards 
the surety’s rights to information (Section 14). A major caveat is that the pro-
visions do not ensure that sureties have in fact understood the information. As 
far as standard terms are concerned, Section 39 Finnish GA, requires that the 
Consumer Ombudsman supervise the terms of suretyships. In addition, the 
Market Court may prohibit use of unfair contract terms in surety arrangements. 
The formation and content of the agreement may also be determined by gen-
eral contract law (fraud, duress, undue influence, misrepresentation). These 
elements are elaborated in the Finnish Legal Transactions Act, which also ad-
dresses coercion and good faith. Moreover, contracts may be invalidated or 
adjusted (Section 7 Finnish GA) where a contract clause is unfair or leads to an 
unfair result. Insolvency law also provides a measure of protection.65 Similarly, 
provisions of Consumer and, more importantly, Family law may supply protec-
tion. Under the 1929 Finnish Marriage Act, property remains separate on mar-
riage, and debts are also to be treated separately. One spouse may be liable to 
another for the mismanagement of his/her financial affairs. Again a whole 
                                                 
64  On adjustment Section 7(1) Finnish GA, ibid. provides: ‘A private guarantor’s li-
ability… may be adjusted if the amount of the principal debt payable by the guaran-
tor is unreasonably high in view of the guarantor’s financial status and the lender 
knew, or ought to have known, at the time of giving the guarantee, that the guaran-
tor’s liability is manifestly disproportionate to his or her capacity of meeting it. In 
the adjustment process, the guarantor’s age, ability to pay and other circumstances, 
both at the time of giving the guarantee and after it, shall be taken into account.’ 
(Translation: Conference Paper 2006, T. Mikkola). 
65  Adjustment of the Debts of a Private Individual Act (Act 57/1993). 
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body of supplementary principles and rules drawn from diverse areas of pri-
vate law provide additional protection. The real standard of protection remains 
to be elaborated both as regards sureties’ rights and creditors’ obligations in 
practice. 
ii. Sweden 
Unlike Finland there is no specific legislation on Suretyship law in Sweden. 
Instead, a general framework is supplied by provisions of the Civil Code, the 
Swedish Contract Act and the Swedish Consumer Credit Act. The important 
role of coordinating this framework falls to Swedish judges and their elabora-
tion of the case-law.66 Whilst suretyships are widely used, they are related to 
over-indebtedness only to a minor extent: surety agreements arose in only 3% 
of insolvency cases in 2005. This lack of a correlation between suretyship and 
over-indebtedness can be attributed to the credit information available to the 
banks, bank practice and the broader availability of debt-restructuring. Swed-
ish social provision defuses the problem of over-indebtedness in the first place. 
Meanwhile, Swedish Family law offers little protection to the spouse even in 
cases of divorce. 
D. The Baltic States 
Again with the Baltic States we are confronted with diversity of approach. 
Moreover, while each of the Baltic States transplanted a foreign or model law 
in the early 90s on attaining independence, these ‘transplants’ were introduced 
with little reflection on the quite different economic and social reality obtain-
ing in the different States.  
i. Estonia 
Kull notes that the implementation of the existing consumer acquis into the 
Estonian legal order has been successful, culminating with the 2002 Law of 
Obligations.67 European model laws (PECL and PICC) and conventions 
                                                 
66  A. Persson, Unfair Suretyships in Europe – Country Report of Sweden, Conference 
Paper, ZERP Unfair Suretyships conference 3-4 November 2006, Bremen. (The con-
ference paper is in the Marie Curie ToK project’s database in Bremen). 
67  I. Kull, Protection from Unfair Suretyships in Estonian Civil law, Conference Paper, 
ZERP Unfair Suretyships conference 3-4 November 2006, Bremen. (The conference 
paper is in the Marie Curie ToK project’s database in Bremen). Estonian Law of Ob-
ligations at: <http://www.legaltext.ee>.  
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(CISG) as well as Swiss and German law have been influential on Estonian 
codification. Yet the social and economic background against which these ‘Eu-
ropeanised’ rules operate is quite different to most western European States.  
- First, creditors on the Estonian market simply do not find taking per-
sonal securities an attractive option, preferring, instead, to either take se-
curities in property or simply waive security requirements altogether; 
- Second, some evidence has tended to suggest that the western ‘gender 
assumption’ inherent in suretyship agreements is reversed by social real-
ity in Estonia. 
Predictably, given the low incidence of surety agreements, protection is sup-
plied by a diverse body of case-law rather than by statute; the 2002 Law of Ob-
ligations provides only a general framework of protection. Non-professional, 
consumer sureties are protected by a number of mechanisms in Estonian law: 
Article 143 Law of Obligations specifies that, for consent to be informed and 
in order to protect the weaker party, both the extent of the obligation and an 
upper limit of potential liability must be set for a suretyship to be valid. As in 
other legal orders, the surety is also protected by accessority and subsidiarity, 
as well as by the information obligations incumbent on the creditor. Finally, 
the surety may also be protected by the principle of good faith (Section 6, Law 
of Obligations). Special laws such as the General Part of the Estonian Civil 
Code, 2002, also protect the surety with provisions on unconscionability, mis-
take and fraud. Yet the reality is that the small number of loans entered into 
and the dearth of case-law on the standard of protection suggests that the over-
all level of protection is likely to be lower than in most western European legal 
orders. 
ii. Lithuania 
In Lithuania, as in Estonia, non-professional personal suretyships are uncom-
mon. Instead, creditors prefer and rely on in rem security provision. Predicta-
bly, this has meant that there is no case-law on non-professional suretyships. 
Suretyships are more likely to be encountered either in the context of family 
mortgages on real property or in commercial relationships. Lithuanian law, 
whilst inspired by UNIDROIT and PECL Principles, does not draw a clear dis-
tinction between commercial and non-professional suretyships, and does not 
classify the surety agreement as a consumer contract to which provisions of 
consumer protection would apply.68 Again, these ‘new’ rules have been trans-
                                                 
68  A. Smaliukas & G. Šulija, Unfair Suretyships in Europe: Lithuania, Conference Pa-
per, ZERP Unfair Suretyships conference 3-4 November 2006, Bremen. (The con-
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planted into a quite different social and economic reality. For example, acces-
sion has left the young with greater income and assets, reversing the traditional 
demographic pattern against which the instrument has operated in western 
Europe. Predictably, the few cases that have been dealt with by the Lithuanian 
Supreme Court concern commercial agreements. Thus the survey of protective 
mechanisms in surety agreements is a theoretical exercise: protection is sup-
plied through the general law of obligations, contract law provisions relating to 
good faith and, most importantly, gross disparity (excessive advantage) as 
transplanted from Article 3.10, UNIDROIT Principles (1994). To a limited ex-
tent, family law provisions on consent to enter into agreements concerning 
family assets or jointly owned property or rights are relevant.69 As surety 
agreements are not regarded as consumer contracts, protection is organised by 
the Law of Obligations rather than consumer law.70  
iii. Latvia 
In contrast to Lithuania and Estonia, the Latvian Civil Code (Latvian CC) is 
based on the Swiss Civil Code rather than UNIDROIT or PECL Principles. 
Whilst reference is also frequently made in court to German practice and prin-
ciples, it is the Latvian CC that is charged with ensuring protection against un-
fair suretyships. Sections 1691-1715 of the Latvian CC lay down the relevant 
provisions. Unlike both Estonia and Lithuania, surety agreements are very im-
portant to Latvian banking practice. However, the majority of suretyships are 
                                                                                                                                                     
ference paper is in the Marie Curie ToK project’s database in Bremen). On the focus 
of recent suretyship reform see: A. Smaliukas, Reform of Security over Movable 
Property in Lithuania: Evaluation de lege lata and proposals de lege ferenda, (2004) 
15 EBLR 879. 
69  ibid. General law relating to invalid transactions i.e. statutory provisions, public or-
der, good morals, intention to create legal relations, transactions entered into by mi-
nors, legal capacity, consent, fraud, duress, economic pressure, real threat, excep-
tional circumstances (Articles 1.80- 1.91 Lithuanian Civil Code (LCC)). Contract 
law provisions on good faith (Art. 1.5, Art. 6.158 LCC) and gross disparity (Art. 
6.228 LCC). Standard terms specifying that the weaker party have “adequate oppor-
tunity” to acquaint him or herself with the terms of the contract (Article 6.185 LCC, 
as based upon Article 2.104 PECL (ex Art. 5.103 PECL) on “terms not individually 
negotiated.”), to challenge the validity of “surprising terms” (Art. 6.186 LCC, as 
transplanted from Art.2.1.20 UNIDROIT Principles 1994). Finally, Family law pro-
tection engages Article 3.96 LCC.  
70  Smaliukas and Šulija, ibid. pinpoint Articles 1.90 and 1.91 LCC on ‘mistake’ and 
‘exceptional circumstances’, Article 6.228 LCC on ‘gross disparity’, Articles 6.185 
and 6.186 LCC on ‘adequate opportunity’ and ‘surprising terms’ as provisions sug-
gesting a ‘potentially high’ level of surety protection. 
 25
attached to real property: over 60% of suretyships relate to loans secured by 
mortgages. In the light of intense competition for financial services loans are 
easily available and banks are lowering their security requirements, and state 
regulation is regarded as lax.71 The protection of sureties is organised on the 
basis of the surety agreement as an agreement of accessory, secondary and 
subsidiary character. Non-professional suretyships are not clearly demarcated 
from commercial suretyships. Moreover, there are no explicit national rules 
relating to consumers entering into surety agreements and no statutory rules on 
if and when a surety agreement involving a non-professional will be consid-
ered unfair. Section 1415 of the Latvian CC on ‘impermissible or indecent ac-
tions’ may be applicable to surety agreements where there is a gross dispropor-
tion between the amount of the debt and the surety’s assets and income.72 Yet, 
in common with Estonia and Lithuania, there is simply no case-law amplifying 
this point. Meanwhile, contemporary Court practice in Latvia suggests that 
Courts would adopt a laissez-faire rather than interventionist approach towards 
suretyships.73 
E. Central and Eastern Europe  
A diverse approach also emerges in the fifth and final legal tradition: the Cen-
tral and Eastern European States. Again, the social and economic reality, as 
well as intense competition amongst financial institutions in these states leads 
to a different perception and response to the suretyship ‘problem’. Graver 
problems conceal the problem of unfair suretyships. 
i. Poland 
The suretyship has been of major importance in securitising credit relations in 
Poland, especially in the context of larger or longer term loans such as student 
finance. There is a strong relationship between non-professional surety agree-
                                                 
71  T. Klauberg, Protection from Unfair Suretyships, Conference Paper, ZERP Unfair 
Suretyships conference 3-4 November, Bremen. (The conference paper is in the 
Marie Curie ToK project’s database in Bremen). Currently 63,2% mortgage surety-
ships, 23 banks operate in Latvia serving a population of 2.5 million people. 
72  ibid. Section 1415, Latvian CC, provides: “An impermissible or indecent action, the 
purpose of which is contrary to religion, laws or moral principles, or which is in-
tended to circumvent the law, may not be the subject-matter of a lawful transaction; 
such a transaction is void.” 
73  As Klauberg ibid. notes, Latvian courts have approved commercial practice on late 
payments involving penalties of 1% a day. 
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ments and indebtedness.74 Polish law regulates surety agreements in the Civil 
Code (Polish CC) in Articles 876-887. The provisions apply generally and, 
potentially, supply protection to all types of surety whether professional or 
non-professional. Whilst there is no Consumer Code in Polish law there is a 
Family and Guardianship Code, which provides additional protection. The Pol-
ish CC stipulates that the surety agreement has to conform to formality re-
quirements: it must take written form and disclose the surety’s intent. Accord-
ing to Article 880 Polish CC, the creditor must notify the surety immediately 
on the principal debtor’s default. The surety’s defences against surety obliga-
tions can be divided into two groups: defences arising out of the primary debt 
(i.e. where the primary contract is null and void; where limitation vitiates the 
surety’s obligations; where the principal has completely or partially performed 
his or her obligations), and the surety’s personal defences (intent, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, error). Additionally, Article 357 Polish CC allows parties to 
argue an extraordinary, unforeseeable change in circumstances rendering per-
formance impossible or difficult. It is then for the courts to assess the extent to 
which parties may be held to their obligations. The general provisions of Arti-
cle 58 and 353 Polish CC, allowing the courts the broad competence to rule on 
the validity of contracts contravening principles of community life and on the 
lawfulness of the contract itself provide additional measures of protection. 
ii. Hungary 
Banks have responded to the avalanche of credit default in the early and mid-
1990’s and to combat the ‘shield’ limited liability in company law was seen as 
providing.75 However, and undermining surety protection, Hungarian insol-
vency law has made no provision for ‘fresh-start’ procedures. Progressively, 
therefore, banks required more and more security in lending transactions 
throughout the 1990s. The legislator also reacted with the introduction of a 
new secured transactions law in 1996. To protect themselves against risk and 
fraud, creditors responded by accumulating as many security devices as they 
could. More recently, in the last two years, renewed competition amongst the 
banks has led to the introduction of more ‘consumer friendly’ financing 
schemes aimed at ‘riskier’ social groups. This development has been accompa-
                                                 
74  I. Lobocka, Protection from Unfair Suretyships in Poland, Conference Paper, ZERP 
Unfair Suretyships conference 3-4 November 2006, Bremen. (The conference paper 
is in the Marie Curie ToK project’s database in Bremen). 
75  T. Tajti, Unfair Suretyships in Hungary – An Undetected yet Existent Problem, Con-
ference Paper, ZERP Unfair Suretyships conference 3-4 November, Bremen. (The 
conference paper is in the Marie Curie ToK project’s database in Bremen). 
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nied by a weakening of the insistence on suretyships. The perception that sure-
tyships could be unfair, or even the idea of predatory lending as a phenome-
non, has simply not yet arisen on the market or in discourse. The surety agree-
ment is overwhelmingly seen positively as a complementary credit device. 
Here it can be argued that graver problems conceal the problem of unfair sure-
tyships. 
iii. Slovenia 
The non-professional surety has been an indispensable instrument for Slove-
nian financial institutions.76 Personal security is frequently the only means by 
which loans can be secured. Again there is a dearth of case-law on unfair sure-
tyships and the legislator has yet to intervene. Evaluating the extent of protec-
tion is therefore a matter of speculation. The Code of Obligations (Slovenian 
CO) confirms the accessory and subsidiary nature of the surety agreement. 
However, the subsidiary nature of the obligation is frequently undermined by 
bank practice to insert explicit words into the contract: ‘as a surety and payer’, 
whereby the surety assumes the position of joint-debtor. Consumer protection 
is supplied by the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) and, in the non-professional 
suretyship context, by the Consumer Credit Act (CCA). Both acts only apply 
to the asymmetrical relationship between the non-professional consumer and 
the professional business lender. Neither CPA nor CCA contain any explicit 
provision on surety agreements. As with other new accession states, Slovenian 
insolvency law does not provide for ‘fresh-start’ procedures. Moreover, there 
is no proceduralised duty incumbent on credit institutions to inform sureties on 
the risks they assume on standing surety. In the absence of a specific legal 
framework, potentially unfair agreements have to be assessed in the light of the 
general rules on unfair contracts. Two options in challenging agreements arise: 
usury (Article 119 Slovenian CO) and immorality (Article 86 Slovenian CO). 
Whilst establishing usury would be difficult, the Slovenian Supreme Court 
ruled in 2005 that lower courts must declare immoral contracts null and void 
on the basis of Article 86. It remains to be seen whether this ruling will act as a 
catalyst of protection. Given the lack of a legal framework and legislative inac-
tion, sureties continue to rely on judicial activism. 
                                                 
76  S. Mežnar, Protection from Unfair Suretyships in Slovenia, Conference Paper, 
ZERP Unfair Suretyships conference 3-4 November 2006, Bremen. (The conference 
paper is in the Marie Curie ToK project’s database in Bremen). 
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F. Study Group Proposals 
Notwithstanding the divergence of national approaches identified in this paper 
and the metamorphosis of the Commission’s approach to the draft directive on 
consumer credit, the Study Group on a European Civil Code (SGECC), in 
work led by Prof. Ulrich Drobnig, 77 assigns protection of the vulnerable surety 
to the general law of contract as fleshed out in the Principles of European 
Contract law (PECL),78 and the specific provisions elaborated by the 
SGECC.79 These instruments adopt a more traditional private law (Austrian) 
rather than constitutionalised (German) approach: unfair surety agreements can 
be challenged where their provisions contravene substantive legal norms on 
good faith and fair dealing (Article 1:201 (ex 1.106) PECL); the provisions on 
excessive benefit and unfair advantage (Article 4:109 (ex 6.109) PECL); and, 
finally, the provisions relating to unfair contract terms which have not been 
individually negotiated (Article 4:110 (ex 6.110) PECL). Yet, more controver-
sially, the specific framework for personal sureties relies heavily on duties to 
inform (Personal Security Contracts, Chapter 4, Articles 4:101-4:108 SGECC), 
apart from rules on pre-contractual information (Article 4:103 SGECC)80 this 
                                                 
77  Working Team on Credit Securities, Study Group on a European Civil Code. Docu-
mentation: http://www.mpipriv-hh.mpg.de. 
78  Principles of European Contract law (PECL) at: http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law. 
79  Special provisions available at: www.sgecc.net Particular rules on areas of contract 
law: http://www.sgecc.net/pages/en/texts/index.draft_articles.htm. 
80  ibid. Para 4.103 SGECC, Creditor’s Precontractual Obligation of Information:  
(1) Before a security is granted, the creditor must explain to the intending security 
provider; 
(a) the general effect of the intended security; and  
(b) the special risks to which the security provider may according to the information 
accessible to the creditor be exposed in view of the financial situation of the debtor. 
(2) If the creditor knows or has reason to know that due to a relationship of trust and 
confidence between the debtor and the security provider there is a significant risk 
that the security provider is not acting freely or with adequate information, the credi-
tor must ascertain that the security provider has received independent advice. 
(3) If the information or independent advice required by the preceding paragraphs is 
not given at least five days before the security provider signs its offer or the contract 
of security, the offer can be withdrawn or the contract can be avoided by the security 
provider within a reasonable time after receipt of the information or the independent 
advice. For this purpose five working days is regarded as a reasonable time unless 
the circumstances suggest otherwise.  
(4) If contrary to paragraph 1 or 2 no information or independent advice is given, the 
offer can be withdrawn or the contract can be avoided by the security provider at 
any time.  
(5) If the security provider withdraws the offer or avoids the contract according to 
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also includes a duty on the part of the creditor to inform the surety annually of 
the precise extent of his/her liability (Article 4:107 SGECC).81 As previously 
discussed, the information paradigm is particularly unsuited to non-
professional surety agreements. 
V. Conclusions 
A. The uncommon core 
The uncommon core of suretyships’ law can be explained by the fragmentation 
of the context in which they operate; suretyships seen as a part of a wider spec-
trum of guarantees; of a layering of protective mechanisms. Against this back-
ground, standards of protection are fleshed out in the framework of specifically 
national consumer debtor protection. Even when we look to the main Euro-
pean legal traditions we thus find more divergence than convergence. This 
means that we need to consider a number of legal institutions, differences in 
banking practice, social and economic factors as they vary from one Member 
State to the next in comparing the nationally specific level of surety protection. 
In turn, this hinders the integration of a European Credit market. Moreover, 
social and behavioural factors can play a decisive role in determining the real 
extent of liability: the level of social welfare may influence the likelihood of 
the principal’s default (Sweden); whilst banking practice will also influence 
the standard of protection (England). Legislators and judiciary have to find the 
balance between competing interests in polycontextural suretyships law: be-
tween contractual security and the interests of guarantors; between family and 
bank interests; between the parties’ rights in bankruptcy; between family mem-
bers’ rights. 
Moreover, the fleshing out of protective levels in suretyships law takes 
place in a fundamentally contested environment. Can we accept the bald 
proposition that the market is self-sufficient, or the economic case that the 
market will right itself? Here, English experience is that judicial intervention, 
insisting on objective, proceduralised bank practice, is always necessary. By 
extension we can see how credit institutions are caught in an invidious posi-
tion, no matter how they decide to deal with sureties they can be charged with 
                                                                                                                                                     
the preceding paragraphs, the return of benefits received by the parties is governed 
by PECL 4:115 or by Book VII. 
81  ibid. Para 4:107 SGECC: ‘Creditor’s Obligations of Annual Information (1) Subject to 
the debtor’s consent, the creditor has to inform the security provider annually about 
the secured amounts of principal, interest and other charges owed by the debtor on the 
date of the information. The debtor’s consent, once given, is irrevocable.’ 
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encouraging indebtedness: whether their practice is to stringently require secu-
rity, leaving ‘bad risks’ to the sub-prime lending market, or whether they de-
cide to waive security requirements and fuel over-indebtedness. Amongst the 
hard choices facing legislator and policy-maker is the proposition that, some-
times, less protection is more effective protection. It is this contested environ-
ment that is held responsible for the under-protection of sureties; an environ-
ment in which general principles of law have become diluted by the effect of 
overlapping sectorial rules and regulation. 
B. Variations of Approach 
The social, economic and legal environment affects the prevalence, nature and 
operation of surety agreements. In particular, divergence arises between the 
function and perception of suretyships in eastern and western Europe. Thus 
private law is Europeanised and legal transplants (i.e. of national or model 
laws) are adopted without the necessary social, economic and legal back-
ground being in place. 
- Ex-Communist societies share a legacy of underdeveloped security law. 
All Eastern accession states had to transplant legal institutions from 
other legal orders. 
- All eastern accession states adopted a market, rather than social market 
economic model. National reform has tended to stress more the laissez-
faire than the regulatory model, courts have been especially light handed 
in adjudicating commercial practice. 
- Given the significant competition for financial services, lower thresholds 
of security, and a move away from surety agreements have been initiated 
by creditors in the more competitive Eastern accession markets. 
- The idea that suretyships are unfair or that lending can be predatory are 
sophisticated concepts. Graver problems conceal such ‘western’ consid-
erations in many of the Eastern accession states, where families tend 
view the suretyship less critically, or even positively. 
This paper has mapped the uncommon, networked and porous core of Euro-
pean suretyships’ law.82 Not only is the structure of suretyships’ law uneven, 
the legal context and function of surety arrangements differing from one legal 
order to the next, the effectiveness of protection and the prevalence of surety-
ships varies from Member State to Member State. Furthermore, approaches 
                                                 
82  B. de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Towards a Post-Modern Conception 
of Law (1997) 14 J.L.S. 279, at 298: ‘We live in a time of porous legality … of multi-
ple networks of legal orders forcing us to constant transitions and trespassings.’  
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diverge between trends towards constitutionalisation and towards consumerisa-
tion of the law.83 In each legal order sureties take a unique place in a subtle 
web of legal, social and behavioural standards. The national approaches can be 
broadly characterised:  
- England: stringent procedural requirements; protection provided through 
doctrine of undue influence and constructive notice. 
- Ireland: an equitable approach, divergence with England on undue influ-
ence and constructive notice, new reliance on procedural safeguards. 
- Scotland: freedom of contract approach; importation of Etridge proce-
dural guidelines in credit and legal practice. 
- Germany and Austria: divergent focal points on gross/excessive and un-
fair disproportion between the sum guaranteed and the Surety’s assets 
and income.  
- Germany and Austria: German adoption of a constitutionalised private 
law approach, Austrian maintenance of a more traditional private law 
approach. 
- Netherlands: layered provisions of civil code, with a case-law emphasis 
placed on private autonomy. 
- France: consumer protection approach, professional and consumer con-
texts treated the same way; assertion of a high standard of protection for 
family property. 
- Belgium: approach relies on proportionality-based insolvency law. 
- Spain: position is based on a kaleidoscope of protection. 
- Finland: adoption of specific legislation on suretyships; setting inter alia 
that the extent and duration of the obligation be specified in advance, 
and the surety the right to terminate the agreement. Family law also pro-
vides a large measure of protection. 
- Sweden: reliance on a combination of case-law; banks due diligence and 
broad availability of debt-restructuring. Swedish social model also acts 
as a shield against over-indebtedness. 
- Estonia: protection, such as there is, provided by a diverse and contra-
dictory body of case-law. Statute, however, lays down the extent of the 
obligation and an upper limit of potential liability to be set. 
Clearly, creating a uniform approach out of such diversity and differentiation 
risks causing more legal fragmentation than it promises to supply truly uniform 
                                                 
83  O. Cherednychenko, cited above note 32, at 4-5. 
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law.84 Particularly striking is the English approach which bases protection in 
adjectival (procedural) rather than substantive law. This highlights a peculiar 
blindspot in codification discourse; the civil law tendency to concentrate on 
theoretical, substantive law convergence rather than the very different nuts-
and-bolts questions of procedure, stressing the age-old linkage of remedies and 
rights in the common law – ubi remedium, ibi ius – more important to the real-
world practitioner.85 Yet, at the same time, the case for passing rationalisation 
measures where there is some degree of commonality should not be dismissed 
out of hand: whilst it may be asserted that harmonisation and codification 
should be restricted to areas of substantial legal homogeneity, the interests be-
hind moves to greater coherence and the potential advantages of a single mar-
ket in financial services cannot be ignored. Similarly, creditors have to recog-
nise their own interests in due diligence standards: no interests are served if the 
surety is unable to service his/her debt and the creditor cannot ultimately re-
cover anything. However, the means by which such a measure of commonality 
can be best achieved can be disputed. The perennial Keck-style question of 
whether market-integration should be sacrosanct amongst all other claims, or 
whether we can allow for difference and experimentation in the law, without 
destroying the integrity of the internal market as a whole, needs to be ad-
dressed once again.86 
                                                 
84  Fragmentation via harmonisation: B. Heß, Die Integrationsfunktion des Eu-
ropäischen Zivilverfahrensrechts, [2001] IPRax 389. Harmonisation – given upward 
derogation, varying approaches to drafting secondary law and divergent transposi-
tion – causing legal fragmentation. Polycentricity dominates the law relating to 
cross-border trade: EC law, new lex mercatoria, UN Vienna Convention, Unidroit 
Principles and 1980 EC Rome Convention. 
85  Critique of codification: P. Legrand, Antivonbar, cited above note 5 at 24 ‘The 
common law will not be allowed to be itself. For von Bar, the way in which the 
common law actualises itself in an authentic manner is to be destroyed in the name 
of the rule of technology, bureaucracy, and the commodity form. Within his govern-
ance project, the basic characteristics defining the common law’s being – its contra-
puntal being vis-à-vis the civil law’s – are to be estheticised out of existence without 
any investigation being conducted into the belonging of which a cultural form like 
the common law is the expression, without any examination of the presence of the 
common law.’ 
86  Joined Cases C-267 and 268/91, Keck and Mithouard, [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, paras 
16 and 17. Confirmed: Joined Cases C-401 and 402, Tankstation t’Heukste and 
J.B.E. Boermans, [1994] E.C.R. I-2199, para. 12. Similarly: Case C-376/98, To-
bacco Advertising, cited above, note 13. S. Weatherill, Why object to the Harmoni-
sation of Private law by the EC? [2004] E.R.P.L. 633 at 646: ‘the demise of the po-
litical assumption that the EC possesses a competence carte blanche to harmonise 
laws may clear the way to a more explicit and constructive focus on what really is 
needed of a programme of harmonisation in the modern EU… the context has al-
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C. The Fault-lines of legal fragmentation 
A welter of contradictions emerge from within and between European legal 
orders in the field of suretyships’ law. Some of the more striking distinctions 
fuelling this incoherence can be recited; first, we can turn to a number of prob-
lematic distinctions within legal orders: 
- Belgian reliance on insolvency law leads to a problematic distinction be-
tween the situation of the guarantor of a bankrupt debtor and that of a 
non-bankrupt debtor.  
- In France, whilst provision is made to discharge the ex-spouse when the 
principal debtor defaults, the surety-widow and surety-dependants are 
less well placed. 
- In Germany the test of gross/excessive disproportion between the sum 
guaranteed and the surety’s assets and income, means that sureties with 
real property assets are comparatively less well placed than sureties with 
no such assets. 
- Restrictive English treatment of the creditor/solicitor relationship means 
that the creditor cannot escape the straitjacket of constructive notice. 
- The traditional Irish position rejecting a presumption of undue influence, 
but allowing a heightened risk of undue influence in the family relation-
ship can be seen as artificial.  
Similarly, problematic distinctions emerge between legal orders: 
- How sensitive should any proportionality test be? What type of propor-
tionality test: Gross/excessive or unfair? Relating to the validity of the 
agreement as in Germany, or to the enforcement possibilities as in Bel-
gium? 
- The extent to which national approaches have been consitutionalised 
(Belgium, Germany and Austria) or consumerised (England, Ireland). 
- The treatment of professional and non-professional sureties: In contrast 
to Germany, where the surety’s contractual inferiority to the creditor is 
indispensable, Austrian rules also apply as between non-professionals. 
Meanwhile, no distinction is drawn as between the professionalism of 
either party in France. 
- Doctrinal differences amongst legal orders sharing legal traditions: con-
structive notice is easily triggered in England, too easily according to 
Irish courts. Meanwhile, Scotland knows of no such doctrine. 
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- Divergent approaches to the presumption of undue influence in the fam-
ily: a liberal presumption of undue influence in England and Germany 
contrasting with a more conservative approach in Ireland and Scotland. 
- In the Baltic States whilst the Community acquis provides a basic 
framework. The accession states, have used a variety of models in shap-
ing their civil law: Swiss (Latvia), German but also CISG and 
UNIDROIT (Estonia) and PECL (Lithuania) model laws. Most of the 
legal orders of the accession states have been heavily influenced by 
German, Austrian and Swiss legal traditions. 
- A number of traditional Western assumptions about the suretyship ap-
pear to be reversed in the Baltic States: suretyships being used as a 
means of supporting the older generation, and made more often by the 
husband for the business debts of the wife. 
- The suretyship performs different functions from country to country: 
serving as a device to secure student finance in Poland; as a means of 
supporting the younger generation in Slovenia. 
- Divergence as between Nordic countries. Whilst in Finland the level of 
surety protection introduced by explicit legislation is impressive (maxi-
mum amount of liability as well as a time limit for the obligation to be 
specified, private party may terminate the agreement). Meanwhile, 
Swedish social provision obviates the need for legislative intervention. 
D. Alternatives: in-between worlds? 
It can be countered that some commonality is present in suretyships’ law, but 
at a different level; that a type of uniformity emerges from the tension at the 
heart of the uncommon core. If we can understand suretyships’ law as the law 
of an interface, of a spectrum or layering of overlapping legal systems, then, 
whilst some elements may require uniform treatment, we can otherwise rely on 
a conflicts’ approach, competition and spontaneous harmonisation. In describ-
ing uniformity through tension we have to change our perception of law. The 
central idea here is that law depends on contradiction; that a multiplicity of 
systems can also work as a unitary network, producing, as Teubner notes, a 
hybridised, ambivalent unity: ‘(O)nly the combination of both sides of the dif-
ference… brings out the special nature of the hybrid: neither mediation nor 
syntheses, but extremely ambivalent unity.’87 
                                                 
87  G. Teubner, In the Blindsopot: The Hybridisation of Contracting, at 11. Available: 
http://www.jura.uni-frankfurt. G. Teubner, Das Recht hybrider Netzwerke, (2001) 
165 ZHR 550. 
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The contract is thus described as combining economic, productional and le-
gal aspects, each facing the other in structural coupling. Can we use Teubner’s 
juxtaposition of hybridisation (integrating networks) and differentiation 
(closed systems) to illuminate the blindspots in suretyships’ law: to see the 
layering or spectrum of protection, and the variable access to credit in terms of 
a unitary network?88 Can an ambivalent unity be seen in the simultaneous pro-
motion of surety protection and private autonomy, and in the parallel operation 
of regulatory competition and competition in the financial services’ market: the 
legal unity of law as a process, or laboratory, or, in Amstutz’ terms, the 
Zwischenwelt.89According to Teubner, freedom of contract, in this layered con-
text, is a much broader concept: ‘While… freedom of contract was limited to 
the protection of free choice in the market against fraud, deception, and… po-
litical interference, the new freedom of contract… extend(s) to a protection of 
contract against the free market itself.’90 In this model the need to limit auton-
omy, to respect a complex of social expectations and third party interests is 
accentuated, Teubner concluding that constitutional law will play a mediating 
role in this hybridised, discursive contract law:91 ‘(C)ontract as interdiscursiv-
ity raises… the issue of constitutional rights... these rights can no longer be 
seen as protecting only the individual actor against the repressive power of the 
state, but… need to be reconstructed as ‘discourse rights’... The… correlate of 
contract as translation would be an extension of constitutional rights into the 
context of private governance regimes.’92 Yet the implications of such constitu-
                                                 
88  As ibid. Teubner asks at 11: ‘Can we, using two mutually contradictory, equally 
entitled theories neither reducible to the other see the contract as a multiplicity of 
systems and simultaneously as a unitary network.’ 
89  M. Amstutz, Zwischenwelten. Zur Emergenz einer interlegalen Rechtsmethodik im 
europäischen Privatrecht, in C. Jeorges & G. Teubner (eds.), Rechtsverfassungsrecht 
(Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2003) at 237: ‘The consequences of this transformation can 
barely be predicted at the moment… much will depend on whether national legal 
approaches will open themselves to the evolutionary logic of relational strategy be-
hind the Marleasing case-law. This in turn will depend on fundamental rearrange-
ments in continental legal methodology which, even to this day… places written law 
at the centre of its operations.’ (author’s translation). See also by same author: In-
Between Worlds: Marleasing and the Emergence of Interlegality in Legal Reasoning 
(2005) 11 ELJ 766-784. 
90  G. Teubner, cited above note 87, at 14. 
91  S. Weatherill, The Commission’s Options for Developing EC Consumer Protection 
and Contract law: Assessing the Constitutional Basis, (2002) 13 E.B.L.R. 497. O. 
Gerstenberg, cited above note 20. H. Schepel, The Enforcement of EC Law in Con-
tractual Relations: Case Studies in How Not to ‘Constitutionalise’ Private Law, 
(2004) 12 ERPL 661. 
92  G. Teubner, cited above note 87, at 18. 
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tionalisation on the constitutional democracy are, as Hirschl observes, massive 
and potentially pernicious; launching a process in which lawyers intervene to 
insulate traditional hierarchical patterns: 
‘By keeping popular decision-making mechanisms at the forefront of the 
formal democratic political processes while simultaneously shifting the 
power to formulate and promulgate certain policies from majoritarian 
policy-making arenas to semiautonomous professional policy-making 
bodies, those who have disproportionate access to and have a decisive 
influence upon such bodies minimize the potential threat to their hegem-
ony… the current global trend toward judicial empowerment through 
constitutionalisation is part of a broader process whereby self-interested 
political and economic elites… attempt to insulate policy-making from 
the vagaries of democratic politics… (I)t can best be understood as an 
attempt to defend established interests from the potential threats posed 
by the voices of cultural divergence, growing economic inequality, re-
gionalism, and other centrifugal forces that have been given a public 
platform through the proliferation of representative democracy.’93 
Alternatively to the language of discursivity, constitutionalisation and hybridi-
sation, the common-law model can be seen as providing a more pragmatic and, 
ultimately, a more rigorous standard of protection. Additionally, the common 
law approach avoids the substantive subordination of democracy involved in 
the constitutionalisation approach. Coupled to a competition of legal orders, 
case-law allows for the adoption of more efficient ‘due diligence’ solutions 
and experimentation,94 with the added benefit that it does not dilute freedom of 
contract. The adoption of a more pragmatic, common law solutions, could, in 
Ward’s terms, provide a more imaginative alternative to constitutionalism.95 
Furthermore, even in Teubner’s terms German-style constitutionalism is unsat-
isfactory, weakening rather than enhancing the real level of protection: the im-
pact of constitutionalism, crucially, always depends on judicial interpretation 
and the impact of a new strain of judicial activism. Whilst the full application 
of a fundamental rights’ approach could work to strike down the most egre-
                                                 
93  R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy, (Harvard UP, Harvard, 2004) at 217. 
94  L. Kähler, Decision-Making about Suretyships under Empirical Uncertainty – How 
Consequences of Decisions about Suretyships Might Influence the Law, (2005) 13 
ERPL 333. 
95  I. Ward, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Search for a European Political Imagina-
tion, [2001] 7 E.L.J. 24, at 39-40. ‘Europe’s future does not lie in ideologies or insti-
tutions, or in Treaties or charters of various enumerated rights... Europe’s future lies 
in the political imagination; in its ability to think rather more of liberty, and rather 
less of ‘democracy’; rather more of equality, and rather less of the ‘rule of law’. 
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gious types of guarantees, caution counsels against such an approach.96 
E. Blindspots in Surety Protection 
Whilst it can be argued that duties to inform are of little use to the surety in a 
family relationship, it can be countered that, where the informational threshold 
is high enough, as in England and the Netherlands, both the surety and, more 
importantly, the creditor will ultimately be influenced. However, precisely in 
these countries suretyships are rarely resorted to, and, if they are entered into at 
all, they are almost always linked to mortgages on real property. Far more 
common in these countries is resort to the more stringent, costly and unsecured 
demand guarantee, a mechanism which offers the guarantor even less protec-
tion. Similarly, even the best intentions behind the French consumer protection 
approach move creditors to leave the suretyship market. The result in all three 
countries is that the poorest in society are either offered worse terms on guar-
antees or are denied access to prime credit by financial institutions. The para-
dox of surety protection is that less is more; promoting standards of weak con-
stitutional protection as in Germany ensures broader and less costly access to 
credit. In effect there is a double paradox: the lower the effective level of 
surety protection, the more widespread the resort to suretyships and the more 
equitable the access to credit. The higher the level of effective protection, the 
lesser the prevalence of the suretyship, the greater the problem of debt-related 
social exclusion.  
But we can go further, the treble paradox in the treatment of suretyships in 
the context of consumer debt is that European law and continental legal science 
as a whole has cultivated its very own blindspot towards poverty law: suretyship 
arrangements, after all, concern access to prime rather than sub-prime credit; 
Commission and civil law concern with the proportionality, constitutionality and 
social justice implications of the treatment of suretyships appears to confirm the 
woeful invisibility of social exclusion, and the uglier reality of sub-prime lend-
ing in Europe in both the Commission and at an academic level on the Conti-
nent: the need for intervention in prime lending in Rotting Dean on grounds of 
social justice, and a laissez faire approach to sub-prime lending in South Shields 
in the name of the free market would be a perverse policy message even by EU 
standards. Yet in this treble paradox we can also see the danger of overloading 
private law with too many irreconcilable objectives; as can be seen in surety-
                                                 
96  G. McCormack, cited above note 21, cites judicial circumspection towards develop-
ing broad doctrine; a lack of a tradition in constitutional adjudication; a reluctance to 
tying the hands of future legislatures; and the broad principle and policy basis of 
constitutions as grounds against constitutionalising private law. 
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ships, seeking the highest level of social protection can be counter-productive. 
Furthermore, the problem of over-indebtedness has clearly not disappeared in 
those countries with effectively higher standards of surety protection yet with 
lower prevalence of such agreements, in such countries such problems are sim-
ply transformed by the marketplace into problems relating to charges on mort-
gages and resort to demand guarantees. Finally, the stringency of the approach 
taken has implications for standards of due diligence; low effective protection 
can represent a moral hazard for creditors. 
F. The roles of legislative and non-legislative Harmonisation 
Given its polycontextural function and uncommon core a dual-track strategy 
involving measures of legislative and non-legislative harmonisation recom-
mends itself for European suretyships’ law. Despite calls for full-blown private 
law codification it is unlikely that ultimately anything more than selective, ver-
tical measures of legislative harmonisation will be adopted in those narrow ar-
eas of functional similarity where uniform law produces clear efficiency gains. 
Whilst such areas, given the heterogeneity identified in this paper, will be rare, 
EU legislation could be important, for example, in ensuring broader access to 
credit, or establishing criteria for responsible lending or community reinvest-
ment along US lines.97 More common will be measures of non-legislative har-
monisation through judicial convergence, a common law turn; and a more ef-
fective, sensitive and constitutionally legitimate way of harmonising private 
law.98 Substantively, all that matters is that the courts achieve the same results 
regardless of which norms, doctrines or procedures they apply in order to come 
to this end. Even without a constitutionalised element, such an approach could, 
in Teubner’s terms, more effectively illuminate the ‘blindspots’ – seen most 
graphically in the variable prevalence of suretyships and the variable standards 
of surety protection – in European suretyships’ law. Understood as a process, 
the adoption of such a strategy would also add the essential sheen of suprana-
tional deliberation to what might otherwise be perceived of as a yet another 
dubious example of European policy-making.  
G. Uncommonality 
A number of propositions emerge from this survey. Perhaps the most impor-
tant are the caveats introduced to the understanding of European Private law as 
                                                 
97  U.S. Community Reinvestment Coalition: http://www.ncrc.org. 
98  A. Colombi Ciacchi, cited above note 17, at 296. 
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a law possessing a clearly identifiable common core, as a body of law suscep-
tible to a broad exercise in codification. Looking at the law in action, and at the 
hard-case of suretyships, we find substantial divergence rather than conver-
gence, and a picture of legal fragmentation and tension. Amongst the general 
mood of euphoria connected to the Commission’s codification exercise, it is 
important to stress the fact that Europe’s Private law can best be described in 
terms of a lack of commonality, in terms of the Tower of Babel rather than by 
reference to an imagined, simplistic commonality. 
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